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The aim of this article is to describe the concept of materiality of 
language (śabda, bhāṣā, vacana) in the Jain philosophy, focusing on the 
literature of classical period (5th-10th c. CE). The main idea of this 
philosophy is – what S. Gopalan emphasizes – identification of reality 
and existence [Gopalan 1991, 13]. Reality (tattva), due to Umasvāti’s 
Tattvârtha-sūtra (“The Treatise on Reals”) [TS], consists of the soul 
(jīva), the non-soul (ajīva), influx (āsrava), bondage (bandha), stoppage 
(saṃvara), gradual destruction of all actions (nirjara) and liberation 
(mokṣa)2. This ascertainment is pivotal to the entire Jain thought and 
from that perspective the problem of a word status should be 
undertaken. Another essential statement is that existence “is permeated 
by origination, destruction and permanence” (utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-
yuktaṃ sat)3. Sagarmal Jain states that śabda, according to the Jain 
viewpoint, is strictly connected with matter, considering it as one of the 
most important issues – an understanding what is really material when 
we speak about a word and what definitely is not. Jain concludes: 
                                                          
1 This article would not have been possible without the scientific guidance and 
support of Dr. Priyadarshana Jain, Assistant Professor and Head i/c, Department of 
Jainology, University of Madras, who had presented to me a very complex and 
coherent vision of matter from Jaina point of view and a problem of vargaṇās, with 
special accentuation laid on bhāṣā-vargaṇās and an issue of omniscience. Dr. Jain 
indicated also Ālāpa-paddhati as a source of unprecedented knowledge on basic facts 
of the Jain philosophy. 
2 TS I. 4. 
3 TS V. 30. 
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“Generally, the Jaina philosophers have regarded word as pudgala-paryāya 
(mode of matter). The treatises like Uttarādhyayana, Tattvārthasūtra, etc. have 
considered word as material. Undoubtedly, the word sound is a mode of matter but 
the word transformed into language, which is able to communicate the meaning, 
cannot be regarded material or non-living in absolute sense. Because, according to 
Jainas the language is originated from living beings” [Jain 2006, 41]. 
 
We face here a real dynamic – a consideration on the nature of 
matter will help us to find an answer to the following question: what 
are the implications of treating word as mode of matter (pudgala-
paryāya) identified as an atom or an aggregate of atoms? And, does its 
materiality suffice to the complete expression and articulation?  
 
 
I. The Concept of Matter According to the Jainas 
 
I. 1. The Structure and the Activity of Matter 
The main ideas concerning the structure and the activity of 
matter have already been discussed in Viyāhapannatti, skr. Vyākhyā-
prajñapti (“The Teaching on Explanations”) [ViP], widely known under 
title Bhagavaī, skr. Bhagavatī-sūtra (“The Blessed Composition”), 
incorporated in the Śvetāmbara canon [Ohira 1994, i]. According to this 
particular text matter belongs to “the substance world (dravyaloka)” 
[Sikdar 1964, 557],  so it cannot be discussed separately from a 
substance, “regarded neither as created nor as destroyed” [Gopalan 
1991, 13]. We read: 
 
“One unit of matter (poggal’atthikāya-paesa) may be a substance (or an 
object, davvaṃ) or part of one (davva-dese). The same topic is further discussed with 
two, three, four up to ¿ and ∞ units of matter […]”4. 
 
 Particles of matter undergo different modifications and due to 
them substance (davva) is constituted5: 
 
                                                          
4 ViP 420b, p. 557. 
5 ViP 332b, p. 145. 
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“The transformation of particles of matter (poggala) is occasioned by a 
[karmic] impulse (paoga-pariṇaya) or by a spontaneous development (vīsasā-
pariṇaya) or by a mixture of both (mīsasā- or mīsā-pariṇaya)”6. 
 
On the basis of these quotations we can observe that the theory 
of karman was present in the time of ViP’s uprising, as obligatory theme 
profoundly connected with the Jain theory of matter and atomism.  
Devendra Muni Shastri realizes that matter (pudgala) was 
primarily viewed as “substance with form” (rūpī) [Shastri 1983, 149-
150], “the biggest part of the Pudgala is the entire cosmos” [Shastri 
1983, 149], owning “characteristics of integration and disintegration 
(pūraṇa-galana)” [Shastri 1983, 149] etc. Shastri, together with R. C. 
Dwivedi, J. S. Zaveri, Raj Pruthi, Helmuth von Glasenapp, Mahinder N. 
Gulati [Dwivedi 1975, 224] and many other scholars, introduces the 
classification of aggregates (skandha), understood as “units of formed 
matter” [Shastri 1983, 152], which are molded by division (bheda), 
union and compactness (sanghāta) or become a combination of both of 
these factors [Shastri 1983, 153]. Despite implementing the category of 
all-encompassing entity Jain thinkers distinguish also its smaller parts: 
in the first instance, a fraction of this very totality [Gulati 2008, 164] 
“measured intellectually as one unit” (skandha deśa) [Shastri 1983, 
154], secondly, indivisible entity (skandha pradeśa) [Shastri 1983, 154], 
and finally, an atom, not deprived of form but not perceptible by senses 
(paramanu) [Shastri 1983, 159].  
 One of the basic texts presenting the complexity of Jain ontology 
is Ālāpa-paddhati (“The Course of Question”) [AP], an appendix to Naya-
cakra (“The Wheel of Methods”) [NC], authored by Devasena (10th c. 
CE). This supplementary disquisition enumerates matter (pudgala) as 
one of six substances together with the living being (jīva), the principle 
of motion (dharma), the principle of rest (adharma), space (ākāśa) and 
time (kāla)7, characterized by the quality of existing. The belief that 
matter is one of six substances is a well-established concept in the Jain 
philosophy. It is present in: TS V. 1, Pañcâstikāya-sāra (“The 
Quintessence of [Doctrine] on Five Extensive Entities”) [PASār 3-9] by 
Kundakunda (4th-5th c. CE), from which five of them are extensive 
entities (astikāya) excluding a category of time, Pravacana-sāra (“The 
                                                          
6 ViP 328a, p. 147. 
7 AP 5. 
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Quintessence of Sermons”) [PSār II. 35-42] and Niyama-sāra (“The 
Quintessence of Restraint”) [NSār I. 9] by the same author, Dhyāna-
śataka (“A Hundred of Meditations”) [DŚ 53] by Jinabhadra Gaṇi (6th-7th 
c. CE), Paramâtma-prakāśa (“The Elucidation of the Supreme Soul”) 
[PAP 15-18] by Yogīndudeva (8th c. CE), Pañcâstikaya-sāra-tattva-dīpikā 
(“The Light of Categories in Pañcâstikāya-sāra”) [PSār-TD 4] by 
Amṛtachandra-sūri (10th c. CE), Gommaṭa-sāra (“The Quintessence of 
Gommaṭa”) [GS 17. 561-620] and Dravya-saṃgraha (“The Compendium 
of Substance”) [DS 15] by Nemichandra (10th c. CE). 
According to AP substance has the following characteristics 
(lakṣanāni):  
 
astitvaṃ, vastutvaṃ, dravyatvaṃ, prameyatvaṃ, aguru-laghutvaṃ8, 
pradeśavatvaṃ9, cetanatvaṃ, acetanatvaṃ, mūrtatvaṃ, amūrtatvam iti dravyāṇāṃ 
daśa sāmānya-guṇāḥ10. 
 
“Existence, reality11, substantiality, demonstrability, state of being neither 
heavy nor light, space occupancy, intelligence, the lack of intelligence, corporeality, 
immateriality – there are ten common qualities of substance”. 
            
                                                          
8 M. Monier-Williams gives the following translation of the term guru-laghutā: 
“heaviness and lightness” and “great and little value”. Taking into consideration this 
first proposition and the fact that prefix “a-” brings on negation we can translate 
aguru-laghutva as “neither heaviness nor lightness” or “endowed neither in heaviness 
nor in lighteness”. Padmanabh S. Jaini, in his preface to Laghu-tattva-sphoṭa (“A Light 
Bursting of the Reality”) by Amṛtachandra defines it in the following way: “This is a 
characteristic by virtue of which one substance, while it may share a given space with 
others, does not assume the modes (paryāyas) of those. It also determines the fact that 
one quality does not, even in a defiled state, become other than itself, and the Infinite 
qualities of a particular substance do not separate themselves from their locus i.e. that 
substance” [“Introduction” to LTS 1978, 8-9]. Zaveri translates it as “(eternal) 
persistance/permanence” [Zaveri 1991, 83]. 
9 AP defines it later: pradeśasya bhāvaḥ pradeśatvaṃ, […] sāvayavatvaṃ kṣetratvaṃ. 
avibhāgī-pudgala-paramāṇunā avaṣṭavyaṃ kṣetraṃ pradeśaḥ [AP 100]. “Space 
occupancy is a state of being a spot. […] The state of being a seat is a state of 
possessing parts. A spot (constituted of parts) is a seat to be stayed in by undivided 
atom of matter”. 
10 AP 9. 
11 Term “vastutva” has been translated by Zaveri as “the universal causal efficiency” 
[Zaveri 1991, 83]. 
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Subsequently AP enumerates sixteen particular qualities of 
substances, including touch (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gaṃdha) and 
color (varṇā), immateriality (amūrtatvam) and the lack of intelligence 
(acetanatvaṃ), which are typical for matter12. The first four of them 
appear in TS V. 23 (sparśa-rasa-gandha-varṇavantāḥ pudgalāḥ). They 
are also mentioned in TS II. 20 (sparśa-rasa-gandha-varṇa-śabdās tad-
arthāḥ), together with sound (śabda), as classification of sense organs’ 
objects with respective sense organs such as organs of sensation, taste, 
smell, sight and hearing (sparśana-rasana-ghrāṇa-cakṣu-śrotāṇi) listed 
in TS II. 19. This very enumeration is regularly repeated in the Jain 
literature of classical period, for instance in Tattvârtha-sūtra-bhāṣya 
(“The Commentary to Tattvârtha-sūtra”) [TSBh V. 1-6] written probably 
by Umāsvāti [Malwania, Soni 2007, 70] and Tattvârtha-sūtra-rāja-
vārttika (“Royal Explanatory of Tattvârtha-sūtra”) [RVār V. 25. 3-4], a 
commentary to Umasvāti’s TS authored by Akalaṅka (8th c. CE), the 
comprehensive study of fundamental Jain thought13. 
Due to TS “material entities are endowed with a form” (rūpinaḥ 
pudgalāḥ)14. While discussing the structure and the activity of matter 
the issue of attributes (guṇas) and modes (paryāyas) – idea present in 
TS V. 38 – move towards focal stage. Y. J. Padmarajiah stresses that 
there are three conceptions of the way they should be perceived. The 
first one, the theory of non-difference (abheda-vāda), says that both of 
them “refer to the same unitary principle of change”, the second one, 
the theory of difference (bheda-vāda), stresses that paryāya is “an 
external mode” and guṇa is “an internal constituting principle of 
change”, and the third one, the theory of difference and non-difference 
(bhedâbheda-vāda), claims that two are “mutually identical and 
different” [Padmarajiah 1963, 258]. AP elaborates on underlying 
division between attributes in general (sāmānya-guṇāḥ) with regard to 
their own kind (sva-jāti apekṣayā) and attributes in particular (viśeṣa-
guṇāḥ) with regard to heterogeneous ones (vijāti apekṣayā) [Vatsyayan, 
Bäumer 1988, 202-203], which constitutes rudimentary ontological 
                                                          
12 AP 11-12. 
13 AP Discussion on this subject in: Jaini 2013, p. 24; Mehta 1954, p. 26; Singh 1972, p. 
67; Bhattacharya 1966, p. 156. 
14 TS V.5. 
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contradistinction between commonness and peculiarity. Attributes are 
the substrate of modes:  
 
guṇa-vikārāḥ paryāyāḥ. te dvedhā, artha-vyaṃjana-paryāya-bhedāt. artha-
paryāyāḥ dvividhāḥ svabhāva-vibhāva-bhedāt. […] vyaṃjana-paryāyāḥ: svabhāva-
vibhāva-bhedāt15. 
 
“Modes are modifications of attributes. There are two of them, because they 
are divided between a mode of an object (artha-paryāya) and a mode of manifestation 
(vyaṃjana-paryāya). The mode of an object is twofold, because it is divided between 
natural disposition (svabhāva) and evoluted one (vibhāva). The mode of manifestation 
is twofold, because it is divided between natural disposition and evoluted one”16. 
 
In the following passages of AP, Devasena introduces a category 
of an atom, paying attention to its indivisibility and aptitude of creating 
composites with other atoms: 
 
pudgalasya tu dvy-aṇukâdayaḥ vibhāva-dravya-vyaṃjana-paryāyāḥ17. 
 
“However, modes of matter, beginning from [aggregates consisting] of two 
atoms, are modification of evoluted substance”. 
 
It should be understood – due to M. P. Joseph’s constatation – as:  
 
“an accidental variation in the general constitution of a substance, as is 
observed in the soul’s transmigrations through various kinds of organic beings” 
[Joseph 1997, 358]. 
 




“An atom, [being] non-divisible [particle] of matter, is a mode of natural 
substance modification”. 
 
The Jain theory of atomic reality enters into different concepts of 
contemporary philosophical strands espousing atomism, such as: that 
                                                          
15 AP 15-16, 19. 
16 Cf. AS 70. 
17 AP 24. 
18 AP 24. 
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of Ājīvikas, whose atomic doctrine – according to Arthur L. Basham’ 
suggestion – was “probably derived from the primitive Eleatic atomism 
of Pakudha Kaccāyana” [Basham 2009, 262], that of Vaiśeṣika [Craig 
1998, 198-199] and that of Buddhists [Jayatilleke 2009, 45-46]. 
The next important factor of the material formational processes 
– mentioned and analysed in the Jain literature, is agglutination, when 
atoms of matter aggregates come together from all directions to be a 
body: 
 
triṣu lokeṣûrdhvam adhas tiryak ca dehasya samantato mūrcchanaṃ 
sammūrcchanam19 – avayava-prakalpanam20. 
 
“In three worlds – upwards, downwards and transversely – [there is] a 
settlement of portions, from all directions, augmenting and accumulating, to be a 
body”. 
 
Atomic structure is not only present in material objects, but also 
in space, which has special construction: 
 
pradeśāḥ paramāṇavaḥ. pradiśyante iti pradeśāḥ paramāṇavaḥ, te hi 
ghaṭâdi21. 
 
“Space units are atomic. They are allocated [in space, and that is why they are] 
space units, [which] are atomic, because they [are like] a pot etc.”.  
 
  Akalaṅka continues that an atom and time are those factors, that 
do not occupy space, because the first one comprises itself only one 
point, the second one does not require any point to its existence22. For 
the author of RVār matter is a kind of entity that can be complex, 
                                                          
19 S.C. Jain translates “mūrcchā” as and “sammūrcchanam” as “spontaneous 
generation”. Cf. TS II. 31, VII. 17. 
20 RVār I. 31. 
21 RVār II. 38. 1-5. 
22 RVār2 V. 1. 16, p. 53. An analysis (all references in this article) of the fifth chapter of 
RVār is based on the book The Jaina World of Non-Living [Non-living in 
Tattvārthasūtra]. English Translation with Notes on Chapter Five of Tattvārtha-
Rājavārtika od Akalaṅka (Royal-Semi-aphorismic Explanatory of Reals) On Tattvārtha-
sūtra (Treatise on Reals) By Ācārya Umāsvāmi, tr. N. L. Jain, Pārśwanātha Vidyāpītha, 
Varanasi, Pradyuman Zaveri, Plano TX., U.S.A. [signified as RVār(b)]. Sanskrit text is 
based on RVār(b1). 
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composing some sort of aggregate, and dissociated, recombined23. It is 
worth mentioning that N. L. Jain translates the term “pudgala” as 
“mattergy”, i.e. union of matter and energy. Substance has modifications 
– RVār informs – but also constant features according to substantive 
and modal perspective24. And what is more, shapes and consistency of 
matter reports to different variations25. 
 
I. 2. Multidimensionality of Reality 
 The famous Jain theory of multidimensional aspects of reality 
allows us to analyse each problem, among others the issue of language 
materiality, from different perspectives: the higher perspective 
(niścaya-nayaḥ) “relating to itself, to substance and to that, what is 
indivisible” (svâśritaḥ dravyâśritaḥ abhedâśritaḥ), commonsensical 
perspective (vyavahāra-nayaḥ) “relating to the other, to attributes and 
to that, what is divisible” (parâśritaḥ paryāyâśritaḥ bhedâśritaḥ), and 
also – what is more interesting to the author of this article – from 
linguistic perspective (śabda-naya)26. The second one, i.e. conventional, 
perspective, subdividing into existing, not exsting and metaphorical 
application (sadbhūta-vyavahāraḥ asadbhūta-vyavahāraḥ upacarita-
vyavahāraḥ iti upanayāḥ tredhā), is crucial to understand how language 
manifests itself27. However, first of all, every thing and situation can be 
analysed from substantial standpoint concentrated on comprehending 
only substance (sva-dravyâdi-grāhaka-dravyārthikaḥ)28 and 
beginingless and eternal modal one (anâdi-nitya-paryāyârthikaḥ)29. 
Commonsensical perspective, essential for this article, demerges 
between that one which takes into consideration variations of the same 
substance (sadbhūta-vyavahāra nayaḥ)30, unmodified (śuddha) and 
                                                          
23 RVār(b) V. 1. 24-26, p. 54. 
24 RVār(b) V. 4. 4-5, p. 86. 
25 RVār(b) V. 5. 3-5, p. 89-90. 
26 AP 41. 
27 AP 44. 
28 AP 54. 
29 AP 58. Cf. RVār I. 5. 31-33 Two modal perspectives are called “substantial” 
(dravyârthika) and modal (paryayârthika): dvau nayau dravyārthikaḥ 
paryāyārthikaśca, tayor viṣayo nāmâdi-nyāsaḥ. Their object is settled by name: 
dravyârthikasya prādhānye paryāya-guṇa-bhāve ca prathamaḥ. paryāyârthikasya 
prrādhānye dravya-guṇa-bhāva ca dvitīyaḥ, RVār IV. 42. 3.  
30 AP 81. 
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modified (aśuddha)31, and the other one which takes into consideration 
variations of different substances (asadbhūta-vyavahāra nayaḥ)32, that 
of one’s own kind (svajāti-asadbhūta vyavahāraḥ), that of different kind 
(vijāti asadbhūta-vyavahāraḥ) and mixed (svajāti-vijāti-asadbhūta-
vyavahāraḥ)33. 
RVār includes a very essential presupposition which can be 
treated as an expounding and an explanation of existential and verbal 
multidimensionality in a nutshell, i. e. material substances from one 
point of view constitute one undivided entity, but from the other point 
of view they are numerous, which means that some of them we are able 
to count, some of them slip out of human cognitive ability to evaluate 
their quantity. It is also possible that there is an infinite number of 
particular material substances. 
 
pudgala-dravyaṃ rūpa-sparśâdi-pāriṇāmika-dravyârthād eṣāt syād ekam, 
pratiniyataîkâneka-saṃkhyeyâsaṃkheyânanta-pradeśa-paryāyād eṣāt syād anekaṃ 
syāt saṃkheyaṃ syād asaṃkhyeyaṃ syād anantam34. 
 
“Material substance from one point of view is one, [when we talk about] the 
substantial object undergoing transformation of form, touch etc., but it is not one 
when [we talk about,] different in each case, mode of being made up of parts – not one, 
definite in number, innumerable and infinite – from one point of view it is not one, 
from other point of view it is definite, from other innumerable, and [finally] from 
other infinite”. 
 
 It is an example of application of syād-vāda theory, incorporated 
in Jain rationality, which assumes that each entity and situation can be 
described from different perspectives – the word syād is used in order 
to express the modality “from perspective x the situation is y” etc. 
Assumptions of this theory doubtlessly create for the Jain thinker the 
matrix of all ontological epistemological considerations. 
 
II. Substantiality of Language According to the Jainas 
 
                                                          
31 AP 82. 
32 AP 84. 
33 AP 85-87. 
34 RVār I. 7. 14. 
Małgorzata Glinicka 
Materiality of Language in Jain Philosophy: Introductory Matters 
[165] 
The information that language is connected with matter appears 
in TS, where we find enumeration of matter’s modes: 
 
śarira-vāṃ-manaḥ prāṇâpānāḥ pudgalānām35. 
 
“[The function of] matter is to create the body, the [organs of] speech, the 
mind and the breath”. 
 





“Sound, connection, subtlety, denseness, appearance, division, darkness, 
shadow, hot light and finally cool light”. 
 
This is admitted by Akalaṅka, who regards a sound as material 
(paudgalika) and not eternal, because it has shape37. 
When the Jain philosopher undertakes reflection on an atom as 
the minutest part of matter, an essential digression appears – the 
theory of molecules (vargaṇās)38. It is of great importance in the light of 
this survey, because it refers also to the speech and is connected with 
the idea of relation between matter and soul. The atom, of vibratory 
nature39, joins itself together with other atoms creating appropriate 
combinations called “molecules” [Shastri 1983, 171], fusing together 
into group of molecules (spardhaka)40. The Jain authors assigns 
Sanskrit terms vacana vargaṇās [Shastri 1983, 171] or more often 
bhāṣā-vargaṇās to describe molecules of speech.  
                                                          
35 TS V. 19. 
36 TS V. 24. 
37 RVār(b) V. 7. 1-2, p. 94, SV 9, 11. 
38 The Jain philosophy distinguishes the following vargaṇas: “set of octons forming 
mortal body” (audārika-vargaṇā), “set of octons forming transformational body” 
(vaikriya vargaṇā), “set of octons forming projectile body” (āhāraka-vargaṇā), “set of 
octons and quadrons forming respiration” (svāśocchvāsa-vargaṇā), “set of quadrons 
forming thought” (vacana-vargaṇā), “set of quadrons forming radiance” (taijasa-
vargaṇā), set of quadrons forming karmic body (karmic-vargaṇā) [Gelra 2012, 20]. 
Shastri adds “molecules of mind” (mano-vargaṇā) [Shastri 1983, 171-172]. 
39 GS 245. 
40 SSār 57 (commentary), p. 33.  
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GS supports us with the following definition of vargaṇa: 
 
paramānubhir anantair vargaṇāsaṃjñā hi bhavaty ekā hi. 
tābhir anantair niyamāt samayapravaddho bhaved ekaḥ41. 
 
“Vargana is a name of a molecule of infinite atoms.  
And a unit of bondage is necessarily formed of such infinite (molecules)!” 
 
The concept of molecules, spread all over the man-shaped 
universe, which movements and vibrations activate specific 
composition of atoms, i.e. concrete situations, gives us an insight into 
complex functionality of word. 
RVār contains a discussion concerning the fact that some of the 
schools considered a sound as a quality of the ether (ākāśa). The Jains 
regard it as an indivisible whole (eka-dravāṇi)42, providing 
accommodation (avagāhaḥ)43, which units are infinite (anantāḥ)44. 
Sound particles of matter are extremely subtle (sukṣmāt) of no 
resistance (apratighātāt) and spread out in every direction 
(samantatas)45. 
 
ākāśa-guṇatvāc chabdasya sparśavad guṇatvâbhāva iti cet; na; amurta-
guṇasya ātma-guṇavat indriya-viṣayatvâdarśanād iti46. 
 
“If sound is a quality of the ether, it should be deprived of qualities like 
tangibility. But it is not so. A quality of shapelessness, like that in case of a soul, is not 
seen as an object of senses”. 
 
Matter, transformed into śabda, spreads itself with particular 
potentiality of velocity (śabda-pariṇata-visarpat-pudgala-vega-śakti-
viśeṣasya tathâbhāvôpapatteḥ)47. 
Experiencing of material sounds by material sense organs is 
connected with the feeling of pleasure (upabhoga) and special 
conditions should be present to make pleasure appeared: 
                                                          
41 GS 245. 
42 TS V. 5. 
43 TS V. 18. 
44 TS V. 9. 
45 RVār I. 19. 2. 7. 
46 RVār I. 19. 2. 
47 RVār I. 19. 2.  
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indriya-praṇālikayā śabdâdīnām upalabdhir upabhoga ity ucyate. vigraha-
gatau48 satyām apîndriyôpalabdhau dravyêndriya-nirvṛtty49-arthâbhāvāt śabdâdi-
viṣayânubhavâbhāvān nirupabhogaṃ50 kārmaṇaṃ iti kathyate51. 
 
“It is said that obtaining a sound etc. through medium of senses is a pleasure. 
It is truly said also that the body consisting of karmans is deprived of enjoyment in 
[the process of] transition from one body to the other, [being the state of] acquiring 
senses, because there is no object of physical senses’ formation and because there is 
no apprehension of an object such as a sound etc.”  
 
Although this article is dedicated to the problem of matter, it is 
worth stressing that for the Jains there are sequential and unified ways 
of viewing a thing and substantiality of language should be discussed 
from several points of view including various considerations on feelings 
and emotions involved in perceiving sounds.  
The fact that substance undergoes modifications implies that a 
word or a sound are also involved with this process. RVār contains the 
passage: 
 
iha loke eko’rtho’neka-śabda-vācyo bhavati tathâbhidheya-pariṇāme sati 
teṣāṃ śabdānāṃ tatra prayogāt. prayogo hi pratipādana-kriyā tasyāḥ śabdârthāv 
ubhāv api sādhakau. śabdas tāvad vyañjakatvāt sādhakaḥ52. 
 
“In this world one object is expressed by many words, when there is in a 
mutation of substance to be expressed, because of an application of these words. Since 
the application is an act of communicating, both meanings of this word [prayoga – 
annotation MG] are proving. Indeed a word is proving because of manifesting”. 
 
To produce a sound one should be active. We read in RVār that 
activity is “a mode of reality” and helps things to move from one place 
to the other, with cooperation of internal and external factors53. Self is 
“a catalytic cause for the activity in other entities” (ātma-guṇas tu 
                                                          
48 TS II. 25: vigraha-gatau karma-yogaḥ, “in [the process] of transition from one body 
to the other there is a vibration of karmic body”. 
49 TS II. 17: nirvṛtti-upakaraṇe dravyêndriyam, “the physical sense consists of 
formation [of sense organs] and instruments”.   
50 TS II. 44: nirupabhogam antyam, “the last is not [connected] with enjoyment”. 
51 RVār II. 44. 2. 
52 RVār IV. 42. 5.  
53 RVār(b) V. 7. 1-2, p. 94. 
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aparatra-kriyârabhe prerako hetur iṣyate)54. It is active – Akalaṅka 
continues – because of the connection with karmic particles55, which 
are infinite in each soul56. The author of RVār, stressing that a sound is a 
transformation of matter, admits simultaneously that it cannot be a 
characteristic of space, as Vaiśeṣika expects it to be57. He claims, 
focusing on the special division between a physical (drāvya) and 
psychical (bhāva) speech (vacana): 
 
“The speech has two varieties (dvidhā vāk) – physical speech (dravya-vāg) 
and psychical speech (bhāva-vāk). Both forms are mattergic (sôbhayī paudgalikī). 
They are mattergic with respect to their being instrumental in production (tan 
nimittavāt) and effects on mattergy (pudgala-kāryatvād). The psychical speech is 
mattergic because it is caused by the operation (kṣayôpaśama) of energy obstructing 
karma (vīryâtarāya), knowledge-obscuring karma of sensory and vocablel subspecies 
(mati-śruta-jñānâvaraṇa) and physique-making karma (nāma-lābha) of limbs and 
sublimbs. It cannot be there in the absence of the above mattergic karmic species (tad-
abhāve tad-vṛtty-abhāvāt). The physical speech is also mattergic which is transformed 
into speech (pudgala-vāktyena vipariṇamata) through palate, lips etc. prompted by 
active soul endowed with this capacity. This is mattergic also as it is received by the 
sense of hearing (śrotrêṃdriya-viṣayatvāt)”58. 
 
When the sound reaches ear it is spread in all directions “just as 
the electric lightning once seen is not observed again” (yathā 
taḍiṣṭravya […] viṣvag viśīrṇā punar na śrūyate)59. The author of RVār 
hands the proof of sound’s materiality: “received by mattergic sense of 
hearing” (mūrtimatā indriyeṇa śabdo gṛhyate), “driven by mattergic air 
like the mass of cotton” (preryate ca mūrtimatā pavanena arka-
tūlarāśivat digatarasthena grāhyatvāt), “obstructed by material objects 
like walls and cavities” (avarudhyate  ca śabda nalavilâdibhi kulya-
jalavat) etc.60 
Akalaṅka analyses the problem of modifications (pariṇāma) of 
matter, understood by him as natural or unnatural expiry of one mode 
and engendering a new one. They are divided into beginningless 
                                                          
54 RVār(b) V. 7. 13, p. 97, RVār(b1) V. 7. 12. 
55 RVār(b) V. 7. 13-14, p. 97. 
56 RVār(b) V. 9. 14, p. 114. 
57 RVār(b) V. 18. 12., p. 158. 
58 RVār(b) V. 19. 15, p. 162. 
59 RVār(b) V. 19. 16, p. 162. 
60 RVār(b) V. 19. 18-19, p. 163. 
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transformations, like molding of the universe, and beginningful ones, 
like changes connected with karmic subsidence or remolding of a pot’s 
shape61. The last two differ between themselves due to the fact that the 
first one is a natural kind of a change and the second one is unnatural62. 
The same situation relates to voice. Akalaṅka presents a concrete image 
– he says that one cannot prove the momentariness of syllabic sounds, 
simply because people located in different and remote areas are not 
able to hear them. He underlines also that the sound appears in one 
moment and disappears after a while without producing another 
sound63. 
Due to the author of RVār sound can be language resulting and 
not64. The first group consists of scripted and not scripted formulations. 
The second one, spontaneous, relates for example to instruments and to 
an omniscient person65. Materiality and, to precise, atomicity underlies 
all the language manifestations. Not only the word itself is of atomic 
nature, but also the subject of verbal designations are atoms66. 
Akalaṅka consistently is in favour of the conviction that touch, taste, 
smell and color are atoms and sounds are groups (skamdha) of atoms67, 
as other modifications68, which “are created through separation and 
connection” (bheda-saṃghātebhya utpadyante)69. 
To conclude, when we speak about language as a mode of matter, 
we must have in mind that simple idea, which has been verbalized by S. 
Gopalan: 
 
 “The world of matter and non-matter is not a mere construction of the mind. 
It has its independent existence in rerum natura” [Gopalan 1991, 13]. 
 
The hypothesis of language materiality effectuates a complex 
philosophical dimension. Because speech, together with mind and body, 
is one of the ways human being functions, it is also exposed to 
                                                          
61 RVār(b) V. 22. 10, p. 183. 
62 RVār(b) V. 22. 10, p. 183. 
63 RVār(b) V. 22. 27, p. 196. 
64 RVār(b) V. 24. 2, p. 209. 
65 RVār(b) V. 24. 3-5, p. 209-210. 
66 RVār(b) V. 25. 1, p. 232. 
67 RVār(b) V. 25. 3-4, p. 232. 
68 RVār(b) V. 25. 4, p. 232. 
69 TS 5.26. 
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interfering activity of karman, distorting the image of word functioning 
and displaying of speech. Accordingly, multilayering description of 
reality presses the Jain thinker to investigate the existence, functioning 
and manifestation of language from various perspectives. Language is a 
necessary component of the universe existence, being a subject of 
causality law, and as the mode of matter it undergoes modifications and 
stages like originating and decaying, simultaneously influencing all 
other components of the universe70.   
 
                                                          
70 Artykuł został sfinansowany ze środków Narodowego Centrum Nauki, nr 
rejestracyjny projektu: UMO-2014/13/N/HS1/01061, tytuł „Dżinijska filozofia języka 
w okresie klasycznym (V-X w.) i jej epistemologiczne oraz ontologiczne 
konsekwencje”.  
The article is funded by National Science Centre under the project no. UMO-
2014/13/N/HS1/01061 entitled “Jaina Philosophy of Language in Classical Period 
(5th-10th c. CE) and Its Epistemological and Ontological Implications”. 
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ABSTRACT 
MATERIALITY OF LANGUAGE IN JAIN PHILOSOPHY: 
INTRODUCTORY MATTERS 
The aim of this article is to describe the concept of language materiality 
in the Jain philosophy, focusing on the literature of classical period (5th-
10th c. CE). I concentrate on the following texts: Viyāhapannatti, Ālāpa-
paddhati, Tattvârtha-sūtra, Tattvârthasūtra-rājavārttika etc. I take into 
account diverse questions such as: multidimensionality of reality, 
attendance of matter, the theory of molecules (vargaṇās) and the 
problem of matter modifications (pariṇāma). 
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